Public Statement MUCA-MI
Source: ResistenciaHonduras.net, 17 August 2011.
Translation by FOA
The Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguan - Left Bank (MUCA-MI), in our struggle for a real and true application of integral agrarian reform, DECLARES to Honduran Society, the International Community, and National and International Human Rights Organizations that:
1. Sunday, August 14, 2011 between five o'clock and eight o'clock in the morning (5:00 AM and 8:00 AM), private guards from agroindustrialist Migue Facusse Barjum's deadly palm plantation brutally attacked our campesino colleagues from the community of Panamá (who are not members of the Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguan - Left Bank MUCA-MI), and according to police reports, six security guards (hired criminals) and an underage campesino, Wilmer Javier Melgar, were killed.
2. Maliciously, certain communication media (radios and newspapers) linked to the interests of agroindustrialists have indicated to government institutions that our colleages Jackeline Liseth Fúnez Bueso, Marco Tulio Paredes Molina, Gerardo Alonso Argueta, Cesar Murillo and Dennis Javier Ramos, who are leaders of various cooperatives associated with the Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguan - Left Bank (MUCA-MI), are responsible for these condemnable acts of violence.
3. We categorically reject these defamatory and slanderous accusations against our colleagues being carried out by the oligarchic press with the intention of criminalizing our struggle and discrediting the leadership of the the Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguan - Left Bank (MUCA-MI). The are trying to represent us nationally and internationally as a bloodthirsty organization with criminal intentions in order to justify the presence of more police and military, fierce repression, and the killing of our leardership in the Lower Aguán Valley.
4. It is no secret to anyone that the activities we carry out as an organization are part of a just struggle for official recognition for land, and as part of a genuine process of integral agrarian reform they are peaceful and public actions. Since we have nothing to hide, we have always declared ourselves and our actions via traditional and alternative media .
5. The violence that has been practiced against our struggle--and especially against our leadership, which has been the victim of assasinations, constant death threats, and a fierce campaign of defamation and slander--does not erase from the national stage our just struggle for land; it does not keep us from using dialogue as an instrument which can help us find a real solution that will end this agrarian conflict. For this reason we reiterate our willingness to participate in a frank and sincere dialogue with the government of Mr. Porfirio Lobo Sosa.
Lower Aguán Valle, August 16, 2011
For a real integral agrarian reform with the just distribution of land, for effective public health, housing and education policies that prioritize men and women, for a full democracy including national coexistence and the full exercise of human rights, there must be social justice for peace in the countryside.
Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguan - Left Bank (MUCA-MI)
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In Bajo Aguán the Movimiento Campesino de Rigores sufferes continued repression
Translated by the FNRPs Translators group from Spanish Version
Source: ResistenciaHonduras.net, 17 August 2011.
The Movimiento Campesino de Rigores (Campesino Movement of Rigores) in the Aguán Valley was violently evicted by military and police forces on the 24th of June of this year, leaving behind a scene reminiscent of Port au Prince, Haiti or some areas of the Palestinian occupied territories. Houses, churches, and agricultural buildings belonging to more than 120 families were razed. Eleven years of effort and struggle without any support from the State were lost in one sad and demoralizing day for the MCR.
The eviction of the MCR families occurred on the 24th of June of this year and lasted from 6 am until nightfall. It is estimated that 20 million Lempiras (roughly 1 million dollars) in damages were caused including the destruction of a 6-grade school, evangelical and catholic churches, wells and fields. As a result, 14 campesinos were detained and currently find themselves processed. This harassment by repressive forces has increased in recent months and is a clear signal to the campesino movements that seek to fight for the land and a better life for their families.
In addition to the last week’s eviction, the campesinas and campesinos who are in the process of reclaiming La Consentida farm located near the MCR area were attacked by three police patrols. Upon its return, the police attacked an MCR campesino who was working on rebuilding his house. He was hospitalized with serious injuries.
The MCR is comprised of 8 campesino joint enterprises that live and work in a 600-hectare area (roughly 1,500 acres). Despite the proximity of great expanses of African palm, the MCR has pursued a comprehensive agricultural model working with basic grains, vegetables, livestock and small animals to produce their own food and some income. This model seeks to distance itself from the African palm oil market largely controlled by the area’s large landowners.
“We have the rest of our lives to keep working” commented a MCR campesina in reference to the eviction and the 3 martyred compañeros of the Movement. “We go out to work and plant to meet our needs, what most worries us now are housing conditions and the lack of clear information about legal matters.” “Besides, we only have one classroom left for 6 grades and 6 teachers.”
The uncertain situation the MCR finds itself in is the same in many places throughout the country, including, among others, the Movimiento 10 de Junio San Juan Pueblo and Zacate Grande. Because of the National Congress’s November 2010 repeal of decree 18-2008, several campesino movements are about to lose a long process of legalization and recuperation of lands. Article 17 of the degree, approved during President Mel Zelaya’s administration, allows campesino communities or businesses who have spent 10 years or more reclaiming land to request the title to it from the Instituto Nacional Agrario, or National Agrarian Institute (INA).
Currently the decree is “frozen” given that it has not been published in the The Gazette. However, the latest news indicates that only a month remains before the decree is to be published. The situation of campesino groups and movements is even more complicated given the Secretary of Finance refuses to pay out money as part of the title transfer process and considers the decree null.
For the campesino families the decree’s repeal is only the beginning of a new attack on their survival. The Honduran oligarchy and transnational capital already have several projects underway: Special Development Regions (model cities), a new mining law, river concessions and the promotion of genetically modified seeds. These projects aim to eradicate small-scale agriculture and supplant it with an agro-industrial model and the exploitation of the country’s natural resources.
Despite the terrible conditions in which the families currently find themselves, the MCR struggle continues. The vast majority are living in destroyed houses with plastic tarps to protect them from the elements. Threats of eviction exist and there is no guarantee from the INA that issue of land ownership will be resolved in favor of the movement.
Los Necios Political Organization
August 7, 2011
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Showing posts with label land. Show all posts
Showing posts with label land. Show all posts
Sunday, 21 August 2011
Wednesday, 4 May 2011
China aids Venezuela to food sovereignty
by Edward Ellis, 11 March 2011.
Source: Correo del Orinoco English Edition, no 55.
Strengthening Venezuela’s agricultural production and the nation’s capacity to supply both its domestic and international food markets has been the impetus behind the creation of a new mixed Venezuelan-Chinese company.
Heilongjiang Beidahuang, an agricultural company that manages various state farms in China and specializes in technological and seed supply, will comprise the Asian component of the new business that will operate in Venezuelan territory. Venezuela’s Agriculture and Land Ministry will head up the Latin American side of the enterprise, which was solidified last Saturday when President Hugo Chavez met with company representatives and Chinese agricultural experts. “We cannot continue to depend only on oil”, Chavez said during the meeting. “That was the [economic] model that was imposed upon us by imperialism, the oil dependent model. We have to produce our own food. First for self-sustenance and then to export even as far as China. That’s what were planning with this alliance”, he affirmed.
The new joint venture has planned the supply of rice, corn and bean seeds from the Chinese firm as well as technological transfer that will be used to develop millions of acres of currently underutilized Venezuelan farmland.
FERTILE FARMLANDS
“We have very good, fertile land that isn’t being cultivated which could facilitate the production of food for around 500 million people”, Chavez explained.
As part of the preparations for the agricultural initiative, Qian Baim, President of the Heilongjiang Beidahuang company submitted a report during Saturday’s meeting outlining the results of a Chinese delegation’s evaluation of Venezuelan farmlands in the states of Apure, Bolivar, Barinas, Anzoategui and Guarico.
“Venezuela has very fertile land, well suited for cultivation and the Venezuelan government has made agricultural production a priority. Our company has a lot of experience in the production of different crops. We have the technology and know-how that can be applied here and with our collaboration, Venezuela will be at the front of world agricultural development. [It] will be a producer and exporter of cereals to supply the people of the world”, President Baim said.
The study carried out by the Chinese delegation focused on soil and water quality and was handed over to the Agriculture an Land Minister Juan Carlos Loyo who signed an Act of Commitment with the foreign firm to create the new joint venture.
According to President Chavez, the new company will begin to plant rice in the Venezuelan state of Apure as early as June of this year. “This demonstrates the willingness that both parties have. We have to prepare the irrigation systems, canals, ponds and wells in order to reap two or three rice harvests in one year”, the Venezuelan head of state said.
The formation of the joint company marks the second agreement signed between the Venezuelan government and Heilongjiang Beidahuang this year. In January, the Chavez administration gave the go ahead to import soybeans and soybean oil from the Chinese company to ensure a three month supply of the commodities in its food reserves.
“[Heilongjiang Beidahuang] is a company dedicated to food production. That’s why I’ve asked for their help in order to increase our country’s food reserves”, Chavez said.
STRENGHTENING TIES
This latest agreement with a Chinese forms part of the strengthening of ties between
Venezuela and the Asian economic powerhouse. Indeed, Chinese–Venezuelan relations have been growing exponentially over recent years with trade between the two nations now reaching over $5 billion a year.
In 2008, the Asian nation built and launched Venezuela’s first telecommunications satellite and last year, China approved a $20 billion loan to Venezuela, the largest in the country’s history. As part of its push to ensure food security in the face of rapidly rising prices, Venezuela has, in addition to China, reached out to its neighbor Colombia, signing a series of accords designed to accelerate agricultural production.
“We’re becoming integrated. Soon we’ll be importing twenty thousand cows from Colombia to strengthen our milk production”, announced President Chavez.
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
In October of last year, the Venezuelan government also nationalized the Spain-based agricultural supply chain, Agroisleña, in a bid to make farming equipment, seeds and fertilizers more accessible to small farmers. Referred to as the Monsanto of Venezuela, Agroisleña exercised control over seventy percent of the distribution of staple crops such as corn and rice, as well as exerting a monopoly over the distribution of seeds.
“Agroisleña was an apparatus that exploited the campesinos who ended up being dependent on the business for basic supplies such as pesticides… It bankrupted many small farmers”, said Elisa Osorio, leader of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, at the time of the nationalization.
HELPING LOCAL FARMERS
In February, the Chavez government launched a new social program, or mission, called Agro Venezuela, with the intent of re-invigorating agricultural production in the country and breaking with a past dominated by fallow estates and transnational agro-businesses. The mission, currently collecting registry information on all producers who wish to participate in the program, has already begun to provide low interest loans, machinery, and technical assistance to farmers enrolled in the initiative.
Yulitma Arroyo, a small producer from state of Lara is one such beneficiary. “We’ve received financing for twenty-three hectares of potatoes, coffee and vegetables”, she reported. Many producers who were adversely affected by torrential rains at the end of 2010, have also received government support.
“[The Mission] has financed cacao and plantain production, which was lost as a consequence of the rains we had last year”, said Damasco Villamizar from the community of Barlovento in the state of Miranda. According to the government, more than 500 thousand producers who have registered for the program will benefit from government aid.
Source: Correo del Orinoco English Edition, no 55.
Strengthening Venezuela’s agricultural production and the nation’s capacity to supply both its domestic and international food markets has been the impetus behind the creation of a new mixed Venezuelan-Chinese company.
Heilongjiang Beidahuang, an agricultural company that manages various state farms in China and specializes in technological and seed supply, will comprise the Asian component of the new business that will operate in Venezuelan territory. Venezuela’s Agriculture and Land Ministry will head up the Latin American side of the enterprise, which was solidified last Saturday when President Hugo Chavez met with company representatives and Chinese agricultural experts. “We cannot continue to depend only on oil”, Chavez said during the meeting. “That was the [economic] model that was imposed upon us by imperialism, the oil dependent model. We have to produce our own food. First for self-sustenance and then to export even as far as China. That’s what were planning with this alliance”, he affirmed.
The new joint venture has planned the supply of rice, corn and bean seeds from the Chinese firm as well as technological transfer that will be used to develop millions of acres of currently underutilized Venezuelan farmland.
FERTILE FARMLANDS
“We have very good, fertile land that isn’t being cultivated which could facilitate the production of food for around 500 million people”, Chavez explained.
As part of the preparations for the agricultural initiative, Qian Baim, President of the Heilongjiang Beidahuang company submitted a report during Saturday’s meeting outlining the results of a Chinese delegation’s evaluation of Venezuelan farmlands in the states of Apure, Bolivar, Barinas, Anzoategui and Guarico.
“Venezuela has very fertile land, well suited for cultivation and the Venezuelan government has made agricultural production a priority. Our company has a lot of experience in the production of different crops. We have the technology and know-how that can be applied here and with our collaboration, Venezuela will be at the front of world agricultural development. [It] will be a producer and exporter of cereals to supply the people of the world”, President Baim said.
The study carried out by the Chinese delegation focused on soil and water quality and was handed over to the Agriculture an Land Minister Juan Carlos Loyo who signed an Act of Commitment with the foreign firm to create the new joint venture.
According to President Chavez, the new company will begin to plant rice in the Venezuelan state of Apure as early as June of this year. “This demonstrates the willingness that both parties have. We have to prepare the irrigation systems, canals, ponds and wells in order to reap two or three rice harvests in one year”, the Venezuelan head of state said.
The formation of the joint company marks the second agreement signed between the Venezuelan government and Heilongjiang Beidahuang this year. In January, the Chavez administration gave the go ahead to import soybeans and soybean oil from the Chinese company to ensure a three month supply of the commodities in its food reserves.
“[Heilongjiang Beidahuang] is a company dedicated to food production. That’s why I’ve asked for their help in order to increase our country’s food reserves”, Chavez said.
STRENGHTENING TIES
This latest agreement with a Chinese forms part of the strengthening of ties between
Venezuela and the Asian economic powerhouse. Indeed, Chinese–Venezuelan relations have been growing exponentially over recent years with trade between the two nations now reaching over $5 billion a year.
In 2008, the Asian nation built and launched Venezuela’s first telecommunications satellite and last year, China approved a $20 billion loan to Venezuela, the largest in the country’s history. As part of its push to ensure food security in the face of rapidly rising prices, Venezuela has, in addition to China, reached out to its neighbor Colombia, signing a series of accords designed to accelerate agricultural production.
“We’re becoming integrated. Soon we’ll be importing twenty thousand cows from Colombia to strengthen our milk production”, announced President Chavez.
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
In October of last year, the Venezuelan government also nationalized the Spain-based agricultural supply chain, Agroisleña, in a bid to make farming equipment, seeds and fertilizers more accessible to small farmers. Referred to as the Monsanto of Venezuela, Agroisleña exercised control over seventy percent of the distribution of staple crops such as corn and rice, as well as exerting a monopoly over the distribution of seeds.
“Agroisleña was an apparatus that exploited the campesinos who ended up being dependent on the business for basic supplies such as pesticides… It bankrupted many small farmers”, said Elisa Osorio, leader of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, at the time of the nationalization.
HELPING LOCAL FARMERS
In February, the Chavez government launched a new social program, or mission, called Agro Venezuela, with the intent of re-invigorating agricultural production in the country and breaking with a past dominated by fallow estates and transnational agro-businesses. The mission, currently collecting registry information on all producers who wish to participate in the program, has already begun to provide low interest loans, machinery, and technical assistance to farmers enrolled in the initiative.
Yulitma Arroyo, a small producer from state of Lara is one such beneficiary. “We’ve received financing for twenty-three hectares of potatoes, coffee and vegetables”, she reported. Many producers who were adversely affected by torrential rains at the end of 2010, have also received government support.
“[The Mission] has financed cacao and plantain production, which was lost as a consequence of the rains we had last year”, said Damasco Villamizar from the community of Barlovento in the state of Miranda. According to the government, more than 500 thousand producers who have registered for the program will benefit from government aid.
Tuesday, 3 May 2011
Putting the deportation of Joaquín Pérez Becerra in context
written for RATB by Sam McGill, 03 May 2011.
On the demand of the Colombian government, on 22 April 2011, left-wing journalist Joaquín Pérez Becerra, allegedly an ex-leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was arrested at a Venezuelan airport on arrival from Frankfurt in Germany. Two days later, he was deported by the Venezuelan government to Colombia. The arrest and deportation has caused a domestic and international outcry against Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela. Pérez Becerra is the director of The New Colombia News Agency (ANNCOL) and a source of re-published communiqués of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP).
Pérez Becerra survived during the mass murder of leaders of the Patriotic Union (UP), which was the legal political party, a coalition of a range of social actors, including the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party. Some 5,000 members of the UP have been killed since 1984, including Pérez ’s first wife. Pérez was a leader of the group during the 1990s. He received political asylum in Sweden in 2000 where he was living until he boarded a plane to Venezuela. Pérez Becerra was wanted by the Colombian Legal system and according to the Colombian and Venezuelan Government; Pérez Becerra had an INTERPOL order out for him.
There have been protests in Venezuela against his arrest and deportation by representatives from Pro-Chávez organisations, including: Coordinadora Simón Bolívar (CSB), the Simón Bolívar National Communal Front (FNCSB), the “Clara Zetkin” Women’s Movement, the Front for the Detained and Disappeared of the Continent, and the Revolutionary Tupamaros Movement. Also in attendance were former Venezuelan Trade Minister Eduardo Samán, current Venezuelan lawmaker Oscar Figueras Yul Yalbur, and investigative journalist Eva Golinger.
Whilst the deportation is a blow to the sovereignty of Venezuela and the struggle for freedom in Colombia, it must be considered in the context of international relations between Venezuela, Colombia and Latin America. Below we detail the current context and analyse the difficult situation that both the Venezuelan government and Joaquin Pérez Becerra were put in.
Political battles over extraditions: Posada Carriles and Walid Makled
In an interview on Telesur the Venezuelan foreign minister, Nicolás Maduro made it clear that they felt obliged to honour the Interpol order for the Pérez Becerra’s extradition to Colombia and that if they didn't they would lose all their grounds for demanding the extradition of Posada Carriles, a Cuban-exile with Venezuelan citizenship, who escaped from a Venezuelan prison in 1985. Posada Carriles is wanted by Cuba and Venezuela for his involvement in various terrorist attacks including the 1976 bombing of a Cuban civilian aeroplane that killed all 73 people on board, and the 1997 bombings of four Havana hotels that killed an Italian tourist. Carriles walks free in Miami today despite Venezuela’s demand that he be extradited to stand trial.
Colombia has recently agreed to extradite accused drug trafficker Walid Makled, a Venezuelan businessman, back to Venezuela. Makled is wanted in Colombia, Venezuela and the US for drug trafficking, money laundering and involvement in 3 separate murders. The US are also calling for Colombia to deport him to be tried in US courts. There is significant US interest in the case due to Makled’s spurious claims, exploited by the Venezuelan opposition to demonise the Bolivarian Revolution, that the Venezuelan government is involved in narco-trafficking and the funding of terrorist groups. There have been several investigations, seizures and denunciations by Venezuela’s National Anti-drug Office (ONA) into Makled’s businesses and his $1.2 billion fortune.
US military threats to Venezuelan security
In 2009 the previous Uribe administration in Colombia signed an agreement to establish seven new US military bases in Colombia, with provisions for the US to use any land, sea or airspace of Colombia as it saw necessary. Furthermore in July 2010, Colombia and Costa Rica agreed to the deployment of 6,000 US troops whilst presenting various arguments to the Organization of American States (OAS) for intervention in Venezuela on the alleged basis of the presence of FARC camps in Venezuelan territory. Chavez placed Venezuela on high alert for invasion and broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia.
These military threats emerged within a regional context that included two new US military bases in Panama, the June 2009 military coup in Honduras, where there are two US military bases, the deployment of up to 10,000 US troops and 47 US warships in Costa Rican territory, the reactivation after 60 years of the US Fourth Fleet to patrol South American and Caribbean waters and the occupation of Haiti by 10,000 US troops following the January 2010 earthquake.
In August 2010, Uribe was replaced in Colombian elections by the new administration of President Juan Manuel Santos. Santos had previously served as the Minister of National Defence under Uribe’s Administration and continues to represent the Social Party of National Unity (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) of which Uribe was president. Although Santos in no way represents a break from the politics of Uribe, at present he is adopting different tactics, by restoring trade relationships with Venezuela and halting the establishment of the US bases. The Colombian Supreme Court ruled that the US-Colombia Defence Co-operation Agreement was unconstitutional as it had not been passed by Congress. The Santos administration has upheld this decision so far.
The decreased threat of a large-scale, US backed military intervention in Venezuela is clearly something that Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution need to maintain in order to preserve stability and security in Venezuela, not to mention to prevent loss of life. It removes the necessity of huge military spending increases which means more resources for the Revolution’s social and development programmes.
International and bilateral trade
Economist Mark Weisbrot has analysed recent trade and diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela, including a cross-border security committee, the resumption of fuel shipments from Venezuela to Colombia and the payment of $800 million outstanding debt owed to Colombian exporters.
Weisbrot highlights that during 2009-2010 when Venezuela cut off relations with Colombia in the face of military threats, Colombian exports to Venezuela fell from 15.6% to just 3.6%. This represented $2.3 billion in trade for Colombia and 11.2% of their total exports. To break this down further, the loss in trade represented more than 20% of Colombia’s non fuel exports, 83% of total livestock exports and 63% of textile exports.
In the context of a global economic crisis and widespread flooding across the region, Colombia accepted further loans from the World Bank totalling US$250 million in December 2010 alone. Given these factors, it seems that Santos is pursuing the normalisation of relations with Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution through economic necessity rather than any political change of heart. However it is an economic and diplomatic relationship that benefits Venezuela also and will no doubt have influenced the Venezuelan government’s decision to deport Pérez Becerra. It is easier to maintain popular support for the revolutionary process if people do not lack basic necessities which are imported from Colombia.
The strength of revolutionaries in Venezuela
Since the 2010 national assembly elections, the opposition are more represented in the national assembly and can block decisions requiring a two-thirds agreement: the Bolivarian forces are having to choose their battles.
The murders of several peasant leaders in the Colombian border regions in April 2011, demonstrates the intensity of the struggle in which Venezuela is engaged. Despite land reforms being enshrined in law, campesinos (farmers/peasants) have been fighting to reclaim land from large land estate owners who in turn are hiring private police and paramilitary squads to murder activists.
Although Chávez has been able to intervene and positively support some prisoner swaps between FARC and the Colombian government, the Venezuelan government is not in a position to declare support for the FARC or to deny Interpol regulations requesting deportations. That is not to say there are not significant forces in Venezuela calling for this kind of position.
Reflections from Iván Maiza
The article by Iván Maiza in the opinion section of TeleSur’s website sets out a very considered explanation of the deportation and sets it in the context of the Bolivarian Revolution’s position globally and its political strengths.
Maiza points out that:
“The fact is that Joaquín was not in Maicao being chased by a pack from the AUC [United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia] and forced to cross the border, nor was he in hiding, nor even terribly upset. He was in Sweden putting together his publication, in peace. So then, he hops on a plane, comes to Venezuela and all of a sudden lands at Maiquetía. And before he arrives, there’s a call from Santos to Chávez, “Hey pal, how’s it going? Somebody I’ve been looking for is headed there, get him for me and send him over, ok? You’re not going to wreck our new friendship, are you?
“And of course to answer that we must first answer the first question: Who told Pérez Becerra to get on that plane? Who told him that everything was ok? Who gave him assurances that everything was in order? I’m sure that if someone told him that the Venezuelan government was not apprised and not prepared to defend him, and that Santos would be riled, he’d never have come. I’m sure he must have asked several times about his security and someone told him, “everything’s ok buddy, we’re waiting for you here.
“The timing was ideal. Negotiations in Cartegena between Lobo and Zelaya, a reopening of trade and relations between Venezuela and Colombia, and the expected extradition of Makled. It was just the moment to make Chávez choose between his leftist friends on the continent, or return to the days of closed borders, of the accusations that his government is an outlaw government that defends terrorists, a return to militarization at the border states of Zulia, Táchira and Apure.
“We are going to elections in a year. The Bolivarian Revolution should be confirmed once again for President Chávez’ last and most important presidential term, and for that we’re looking at two basic fronts in the struggle, both with the premise of granting a better life to the majority of the people. For the people who seek to consolidate their definitive independence, these fronts are housing and food sovereignty, which would allow for increased happiness for the people, guarantee a good life for the country’s children, allow us to prove that socialism is more productive than capitalism and consolidate a new model of development and production in the region.
"All that implies:
1. Not being at war.
2. Not being forced to increase military spending.
3. Not having a closed border (just try to win an election without sanitary napkins or diapers).
4. Stopping the murder for hire of popular leaders in agricultural zones.
5. Being able to rely on construction materials to build housing.
The main task is to guarantee that the objectives set for the election in 2012 are met, that homes, buildings, and communities can be built and that crops be planted, and in that we’ve decided to bet on the continuity of the revolutionary process, giving our best day to day, so that later in 2013 and 2019 when we face the need to consolidate the revolution beyond a particular leader, the revolution can walk on its own two feet.”
Conclusions
When drawing any conclusions from this series of events, it’s clearly a difficult and regrettable state of affairs that has lead to the arrest and deportation of Pérez Becerra. It represents a blow for the anti-imperialist struggle in Colombia and Venezuela. However, given the economic, political and military pressures facing Venezuela currently, it seems that the decision was forced when Becerra boarded the plane in Frankfurt (where the Interpol order was not implemented).
The deportation has been used inside and outside Venezuela by groups on the left and the right alike to denounce Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. However, we must recognise that the project of building socialism in Venezuela is not a utopia or some idealist dogma that exists in a political and economic vacuum, free to be guided by absolute principles. The Bolivarian struggle develops in a hostile world dominated by imperialist interests which seek to destroy it at each turn, it is forced to make concessions, sometimes taking two steps back to take one step forward.
Is it still a process worth fighting for and defending, warts and all? The millions of Venezuelans who have started to take control of their own lives through communal councils and other organs of people power, who have benefited from free healthcare and education for the first time in history, and who have won control over nationalised natural resources will answer this with their actions. No doubt, they will continue to strengthen and deepen the revolutionary process demanding more and greater radicalisation in their own interests and in the interests of the poor and oppressed throughout the world.
On the demand of the Colombian government, on 22 April 2011, left-wing journalist Joaquín Pérez Becerra, allegedly an ex-leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was arrested at a Venezuelan airport on arrival from Frankfurt in Germany. Two days later, he was deported by the Venezuelan government to Colombia. The arrest and deportation has caused a domestic and international outcry against Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela. Pérez Becerra is the director of The New Colombia News Agency (ANNCOL) and a source of re-published communiqués of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP).
Pérez Becerra survived during the mass murder of leaders of the Patriotic Union (UP), which was the legal political party, a coalition of a range of social actors, including the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party. Some 5,000 members of the UP have been killed since 1984, including Pérez ’s first wife. Pérez was a leader of the group during the 1990s. He received political asylum in Sweden in 2000 where he was living until he boarded a plane to Venezuela. Pérez Becerra was wanted by the Colombian Legal system and according to the Colombian and Venezuelan Government; Pérez Becerra had an INTERPOL order out for him.
There have been protests in Venezuela against his arrest and deportation by representatives from Pro-Chávez organisations, including: Coordinadora Simón Bolívar (CSB), the Simón Bolívar National Communal Front (FNCSB), the “Clara Zetkin” Women’s Movement, the Front for the Detained and Disappeared of the Continent, and the Revolutionary Tupamaros Movement. Also in attendance were former Venezuelan Trade Minister Eduardo Samán, current Venezuelan lawmaker Oscar Figueras Yul Yalbur, and investigative journalist Eva Golinger.
Whilst the deportation is a blow to the sovereignty of Venezuela and the struggle for freedom in Colombia, it must be considered in the context of international relations between Venezuela, Colombia and Latin America. Below we detail the current context and analyse the difficult situation that both the Venezuelan government and Joaquin Pérez Becerra were put in.
Political battles over extraditions: Posada Carriles and Walid Makled
In an interview on Telesur the Venezuelan foreign minister, Nicolás Maduro made it clear that they felt obliged to honour the Interpol order for the Pérez Becerra’s extradition to Colombia and that if they didn't they would lose all their grounds for demanding the extradition of Posada Carriles, a Cuban-exile with Venezuelan citizenship, who escaped from a Venezuelan prison in 1985. Posada Carriles is wanted by Cuba and Venezuela for his involvement in various terrorist attacks including the 1976 bombing of a Cuban civilian aeroplane that killed all 73 people on board, and the 1997 bombings of four Havana hotels that killed an Italian tourist. Carriles walks free in Miami today despite Venezuela’s demand that he be extradited to stand trial.
Colombia has recently agreed to extradite accused drug trafficker Walid Makled, a Venezuelan businessman, back to Venezuela. Makled is wanted in Colombia, Venezuela and the US for drug trafficking, money laundering and involvement in 3 separate murders. The US are also calling for Colombia to deport him to be tried in US courts. There is significant US interest in the case due to Makled’s spurious claims, exploited by the Venezuelan opposition to demonise the Bolivarian Revolution, that the Venezuelan government is involved in narco-trafficking and the funding of terrorist groups. There have been several investigations, seizures and denunciations by Venezuela’s National Anti-drug Office (ONA) into Makled’s businesses and his $1.2 billion fortune.
US military threats to Venezuelan security
In 2009 the previous Uribe administration in Colombia signed an agreement to establish seven new US military bases in Colombia, with provisions for the US to use any land, sea or airspace of Colombia as it saw necessary. Furthermore in July 2010, Colombia and Costa Rica agreed to the deployment of 6,000 US troops whilst presenting various arguments to the Organization of American States (OAS) for intervention in Venezuela on the alleged basis of the presence of FARC camps in Venezuelan territory. Chavez placed Venezuela on high alert for invasion and broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia.
These military threats emerged within a regional context that included two new US military bases in Panama, the June 2009 military coup in Honduras, where there are two US military bases, the deployment of up to 10,000 US troops and 47 US warships in Costa Rican territory, the reactivation after 60 years of the US Fourth Fleet to patrol South American and Caribbean waters and the occupation of Haiti by 10,000 US troops following the January 2010 earthquake.
In August 2010, Uribe was replaced in Colombian elections by the new administration of President Juan Manuel Santos. Santos had previously served as the Minister of National Defence under Uribe’s Administration and continues to represent the Social Party of National Unity (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) of which Uribe was president. Although Santos in no way represents a break from the politics of Uribe, at present he is adopting different tactics, by restoring trade relationships with Venezuela and halting the establishment of the US bases. The Colombian Supreme Court ruled that the US-Colombia Defence Co-operation Agreement was unconstitutional as it had not been passed by Congress. The Santos administration has upheld this decision so far.
The decreased threat of a large-scale, US backed military intervention in Venezuela is clearly something that Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution need to maintain in order to preserve stability and security in Venezuela, not to mention to prevent loss of life. It removes the necessity of huge military spending increases which means more resources for the Revolution’s social and development programmes.
International and bilateral trade
Economist Mark Weisbrot has analysed recent trade and diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela, including a cross-border security committee, the resumption of fuel shipments from Venezuela to Colombia and the payment of $800 million outstanding debt owed to Colombian exporters.
Weisbrot highlights that during 2009-2010 when Venezuela cut off relations with Colombia in the face of military threats, Colombian exports to Venezuela fell from 15.6% to just 3.6%. This represented $2.3 billion in trade for Colombia and 11.2% of their total exports. To break this down further, the loss in trade represented more than 20% of Colombia’s non fuel exports, 83% of total livestock exports and 63% of textile exports.
In the context of a global economic crisis and widespread flooding across the region, Colombia accepted further loans from the World Bank totalling US$250 million in December 2010 alone. Given these factors, it seems that Santos is pursuing the normalisation of relations with Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution through economic necessity rather than any political change of heart. However it is an economic and diplomatic relationship that benefits Venezuela also and will no doubt have influenced the Venezuelan government’s decision to deport Pérez Becerra. It is easier to maintain popular support for the revolutionary process if people do not lack basic necessities which are imported from Colombia.
The strength of revolutionaries in Venezuela
Since the 2010 national assembly elections, the opposition are more represented in the national assembly and can block decisions requiring a two-thirds agreement: the Bolivarian forces are having to choose their battles.
The murders of several peasant leaders in the Colombian border regions in April 2011, demonstrates the intensity of the struggle in which Venezuela is engaged. Despite land reforms being enshrined in law, campesinos (farmers/peasants) have been fighting to reclaim land from large land estate owners who in turn are hiring private police and paramilitary squads to murder activists.
Although Chávez has been able to intervene and positively support some prisoner swaps between FARC and the Colombian government, the Venezuelan government is not in a position to declare support for the FARC or to deny Interpol regulations requesting deportations. That is not to say there are not significant forces in Venezuela calling for this kind of position.
Reflections from Iván Maiza
The article by Iván Maiza in the opinion section of TeleSur’s website sets out a very considered explanation of the deportation and sets it in the context of the Bolivarian Revolution’s position globally and its political strengths.
Maiza points out that:
“The fact is that Joaquín was not in Maicao being chased by a pack from the AUC [United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia] and forced to cross the border, nor was he in hiding, nor even terribly upset. He was in Sweden putting together his publication, in peace. So then, he hops on a plane, comes to Venezuela and all of a sudden lands at Maiquetía. And before he arrives, there’s a call from Santos to Chávez, “Hey pal, how’s it going? Somebody I’ve been looking for is headed there, get him for me and send him over, ok? You’re not going to wreck our new friendship, are you?
“And of course to answer that we must first answer the first question: Who told Pérez Becerra to get on that plane? Who told him that everything was ok? Who gave him assurances that everything was in order? I’m sure that if someone told him that the Venezuelan government was not apprised and not prepared to defend him, and that Santos would be riled, he’d never have come. I’m sure he must have asked several times about his security and someone told him, “everything’s ok buddy, we’re waiting for you here.
“The timing was ideal. Negotiations in Cartegena between Lobo and Zelaya, a reopening of trade and relations between Venezuela and Colombia, and the expected extradition of Makled. It was just the moment to make Chávez choose between his leftist friends on the continent, or return to the days of closed borders, of the accusations that his government is an outlaw government that defends terrorists, a return to militarization at the border states of Zulia, Táchira and Apure.
“We are going to elections in a year. The Bolivarian Revolution should be confirmed once again for President Chávez’ last and most important presidential term, and for that we’re looking at two basic fronts in the struggle, both with the premise of granting a better life to the majority of the people. For the people who seek to consolidate their definitive independence, these fronts are housing and food sovereignty, which would allow for increased happiness for the people, guarantee a good life for the country’s children, allow us to prove that socialism is more productive than capitalism and consolidate a new model of development and production in the region.
"All that implies:
1. Not being at war.
2. Not being forced to increase military spending.
3. Not having a closed border (just try to win an election without sanitary napkins or diapers).
4. Stopping the murder for hire of popular leaders in agricultural zones.
5. Being able to rely on construction materials to build housing.
The main task is to guarantee that the objectives set for the election in 2012 are met, that homes, buildings, and communities can be built and that crops be planted, and in that we’ve decided to bet on the continuity of the revolutionary process, giving our best day to day, so that later in 2013 and 2019 when we face the need to consolidate the revolution beyond a particular leader, the revolution can walk on its own two feet.”
Conclusions
When drawing any conclusions from this series of events, it’s clearly a difficult and regrettable state of affairs that has lead to the arrest and deportation of Pérez Becerra. It represents a blow for the anti-imperialist struggle in Colombia and Venezuela. However, given the economic, political and military pressures facing Venezuela currently, it seems that the decision was forced when Becerra boarded the plane in Frankfurt (where the Interpol order was not implemented).
The deportation has been used inside and outside Venezuela by groups on the left and the right alike to denounce Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. However, we must recognise that the project of building socialism in Venezuela is not a utopia or some idealist dogma that exists in a political and economic vacuum, free to be guided by absolute principles. The Bolivarian struggle develops in a hostile world dominated by imperialist interests which seek to destroy it at each turn, it is forced to make concessions, sometimes taking two steps back to take one step forward.
Is it still a process worth fighting for and defending, warts and all? The millions of Venezuelans who have started to take control of their own lives through communal councils and other organs of people power, who have benefited from free healthcare and education for the first time in history, and who have won control over nationalised natural resources will answer this with their actions. No doubt, they will continue to strengthen and deepen the revolutionary process demanding more and greater radicalisation in their own interests and in the interests of the poor and oppressed throughout the world.
Sunday, 17 April 2011
Honduran Resistance organises general strike
by Heather Cottin
Source: Worker's World, 07 April 2011.
All sectors of Honduran society are in resistance. Since the late February National Assembly of the Honduran National Front for Popular Resistance (FNRP) held in Tegucigalpa, a month-long teachers strike, a mass demonstration of the Garifuna (Black) community, a one-day general strike, and peasant and Indigenous mobilizations have shown that Honduras is at a crossroads.
An “Intermediate Assembly” of 150 delegates, selected from the 1,500 delegates at the National Assembly, supported these struggles and made the historic decision at the end of March. It decided to guarantee that the leading National Executive Commission of the FNRP will have equal representation of women and men, including representatives from the Original People (Indigenous), Garifuna and lesbian/gay/bi/trans/queer communities.
Lucy Pagoada, a Honduran-U.S. participant at the Intermediate Assembly, told Workers World, “This decision was a revolutionary moment. We created a new system, and the people selected were true leaders.”
FNRP leader Juan Barahona said, “The struggle is against the coup leaders and the government of the dictator Pepe Lobo. We will not back down until we bring down this coup regime.” (AP, April 1) Lobo’s election in November 2009 was organized with the complicity of the U.S. government and the regime of Roberto Micheletti, who replaced the legitimate government of President Manuel Zelaya through a military coup in June 2009.
On March 26 police in the capital of Tegucigalpa beat Garifuna Resistance leader Miriam Miranda, the leader of Ofraneh, the Afro-Honduran organization. That day thousands of people surged into the streets to commemorate the 214 years since enslaved people fled the island of St. Vincent to take refuge in Honduras. Miranda emerged from the hospital on April 1 to lead the Garifuna commemoration of their culture known as the “Month of Our Inheritance,” with 214 drums beating a revolutionary cadence.
The 150 delegates of the Intermediate Assembly, which includes representatives from all of Honduras’ departments, elected Miranda to the new National Executive Commission of the FNRP.
The assembly also gave overwhelming support for the beleaguered Honduran teachers who face a new anti-union law. Honduras’ teachers have been on strike for a month, demanding six months of back pay. The teachers have been “the backbone of the resistance,” said Pagoada, a New York City teacher herself. She explained that the Lobo government is attempting to privatize education in order to break the Honduran teachers unions.
“The whole country is mobilized against this law that aims to privatize the educational system. Parents and students are occupying schools,” said Pagoada. Teachers are facing brutal repression. A police tear gas canister killed a teacher on strike, Ilse Ivanic Vásquez [actually Ilse Ivania Velásquez - RATB]. The armed forces have occupied the teachers college.
“In this fascist government there is no room for dialogue,” said Jaime Rodríguez, president of the Honduran Federation of Teachers Organization. “The only way is to mobilize people.” (AP, April 1)
The Intermediate Assembly called for a general strike for March 30, which was successful in every municipality. The Lobo government reacted by sending in the Honduran police to attack teachers, students, workers, farmers and organizations demanding better education, an increase in the minimum wage and protesting against fuel price hikes. (NPR, April 1) The Resistance plans another shutdown for April 12.
‘Constituyente’ and Refoundation
The Intermediate Assembly is also working on what they call the “constituyente,” which will take up the concept of “refoundation” for the entire country. The “constituyente” was the plan Manuel Zelaya was working on to rewrite the repressive 1982 Constitution when he was overthrown by the military coup in June 2009.
In the 1980s, U.S. military spending in Honduras increased tenfold. U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte worked with Honduran Gen. Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, who trained at the infamous School of the Americas. Martínez ran the death squads in Honduras. The Pentagon used Honduras as headquarters for its control of the Contra war against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and the anti-revolutionary military campaigns against the popular struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The 1982 Constitution provided formal legitimacy for the Honduran oligarchy. The Resistance is focusing in the coming months on preparing a new government structure. By June the Intermediate Assembly forces plan to have a working document to submit to the Resistance bases in all 18 departments.
The 1982 Constitution maintains the power of the owners of Honduras’ “latifundios,” the huge farms carved out of the Indigenous peoples’ lands. Peasant organizations, especially COPINH, led by Berta Cáceres and representing the Indigenous or Original People of Honduras, are especially concerned. The peasant resistance leaders want more than land reform. They are calling for nothing less than “Land Revolution.” They want their land back.
“This is the meaning of ‘refoundation.’ The peasants are putting their lives on this. The people feel they have the right to the land. The refoundation means everything has to be new. We want a different society, and power must come from the bottom,” Pagoada said.
Source: Worker's World, 07 April 2011.
All sectors of Honduran society are in resistance. Since the late February National Assembly of the Honduran National Front for Popular Resistance (FNRP) held in Tegucigalpa, a month-long teachers strike, a mass demonstration of the Garifuna (Black) community, a one-day general strike, and peasant and Indigenous mobilizations have shown that Honduras is at a crossroads.
An “Intermediate Assembly” of 150 delegates, selected from the 1,500 delegates at the National Assembly, supported these struggles and made the historic decision at the end of March. It decided to guarantee that the leading National Executive Commission of the FNRP will have equal representation of women and men, including representatives from the Original People (Indigenous), Garifuna and lesbian/gay/bi/trans/queer communities.
Lucy Pagoada, a Honduran-U.S. participant at the Intermediate Assembly, told Workers World, “This decision was a revolutionary moment. We created a new system, and the people selected were true leaders.”
FNRP leader Juan Barahona said, “The struggle is against the coup leaders and the government of the dictator Pepe Lobo. We will not back down until we bring down this coup regime.” (AP, April 1) Lobo’s election in November 2009 was organized with the complicity of the U.S. government and the regime of Roberto Micheletti, who replaced the legitimate government of President Manuel Zelaya through a military coup in June 2009.
On March 26 police in the capital of Tegucigalpa beat Garifuna Resistance leader Miriam Miranda, the leader of Ofraneh, the Afro-Honduran organization. That day thousands of people surged into the streets to commemorate the 214 years since enslaved people fled the island of St. Vincent to take refuge in Honduras. Miranda emerged from the hospital on April 1 to lead the Garifuna commemoration of their culture known as the “Month of Our Inheritance,” with 214 drums beating a revolutionary cadence.
The 150 delegates of the Intermediate Assembly, which includes representatives from all of Honduras’ departments, elected Miranda to the new National Executive Commission of the FNRP.
The assembly also gave overwhelming support for the beleaguered Honduran teachers who face a new anti-union law. Honduras’ teachers have been on strike for a month, demanding six months of back pay. The teachers have been “the backbone of the resistance,” said Pagoada, a New York City teacher herself. She explained that the Lobo government is attempting to privatize education in order to break the Honduran teachers unions.
“The whole country is mobilized against this law that aims to privatize the educational system. Parents and students are occupying schools,” said Pagoada. Teachers are facing brutal repression. A police tear gas canister killed a teacher on strike, Ilse Ivanic Vásquez [actually Ilse Ivania Velásquez - RATB]. The armed forces have occupied the teachers college.
“In this fascist government there is no room for dialogue,” said Jaime Rodríguez, president of the Honduran Federation of Teachers Organization. “The only way is to mobilize people.” (AP, April 1)
The Intermediate Assembly called for a general strike for March 30, which was successful in every municipality. The Lobo government reacted by sending in the Honduran police to attack teachers, students, workers, farmers and organizations demanding better education, an increase in the minimum wage and protesting against fuel price hikes. (NPR, April 1) The Resistance plans another shutdown for April 12.
‘Constituyente’ and Refoundation
The Intermediate Assembly is also working on what they call the “constituyente,” which will take up the concept of “refoundation” for the entire country. The “constituyente” was the plan Manuel Zelaya was working on to rewrite the repressive 1982 Constitution when he was overthrown by the military coup in June 2009.
In the 1980s, U.S. military spending in Honduras increased tenfold. U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte worked with Honduran Gen. Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, who trained at the infamous School of the Americas. Martínez ran the death squads in Honduras. The Pentagon used Honduras as headquarters for its control of the Contra war against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and the anti-revolutionary military campaigns against the popular struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The 1982 Constitution provided formal legitimacy for the Honduran oligarchy. The Resistance is focusing in the coming months on preparing a new government structure. By June the Intermediate Assembly forces plan to have a working document to submit to the Resistance bases in all 18 departments.
The 1982 Constitution maintains the power of the owners of Honduras’ “latifundios,” the huge farms carved out of the Indigenous peoples’ lands. Peasant organizations, especially COPINH, led by Berta Cáceres and representing the Indigenous or Original People of Honduras, are especially concerned. The peasant resistance leaders want more than land reform. They are calling for nothing less than “Land Revolution.” They want their land back.
“This is the meaning of ‘refoundation.’ The peasants are putting their lives on this. The people feel they have the right to the land. The refoundation means everything has to be new. We want a different society, and power must come from the bottom,” Pagoada said.
Friday, 4 March 2011
The Special Period
Cuba: From The Special Period in Peacetime to Raul
by Dr Stephen Wilkinson, International Institute for the Study of Cuba, London Metropolitan University, 15 May 2008.
Introduction: What was the ‘Special Period’
The term ‘Special Period in Peacetime’ has a curious etymology that explains much about its nature. It is derived from the phrase ‘Special Period in time of war’ which was the name given to the survival plan that Cuba had prepared during the Cold War in case of a conflict breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States. In such a scenario, Cuba would have been bereft of its supplies and possibly completely blockaded, so there was a contingency plan that would ensure that there would be an orderly response to the scarcities of food and fuel that would ensue. When the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989-91, Cuba was left without its main trading partners and economic patron, to all intents a situation exactly similar to that which would have happened in a war - hence the adoption of the war contingency plan and it being called by the same name save for the circumstance of ‘peacetime.’
Thus the ‘Special Period’ was initially the putting into action of a planned response to the economic crisis that began in 1991 as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the COMECON countries of Eastern Europe. The ‘Special Period’ became institutionalised later to signify the extended period of deprivation that ensued and the long haul out of recession. By being called ‘special’ and a ‘period’ it always conveyed a sense of the ephemeral. Implicit in the name is the notion that the situation is temporary, the bad times would eventually pass.
The economic depression of the Special Period was at its most severe in the early-to-mid 1990s before slightly declining in severity towards the end of the decade. Since the beginning of the present century, and especially since 2003 onwards, Cuba has been experiencing an accelerated economic growth so that while officially the ‘Special Period’ has not been formally ended, it is now increasingly perceived as a thing of the past. Recent economic reforms instituted since Raúl Castro took over the Presidency in February 2008 are indicators that the restraints imposed on the Cuban population to combat the crisis are now no longer necessary. Thus it is increasingly possible to talk of the Special Period in the past tense.
The Special Period was defined primarily by severe shortages of hydrocarbon energy resources in the form of petrol, diesel, and other oil derivatives that occurred when the economic agreements between the oil-rich Soviet Union and Cuba suddenly ceased. Internally, the period was characterised by a reform process that transformed of the Cuban revolutionary programme, bringing changes in the economy, the introduction of sustainable agriculture techniques, a decreased use of energy, the overhaul of industry and a diversification of the economic base. The period also required political changes that introduced some elements of greater democracy and involvement by the Cuban population in decision-making (though not liberal democracy as understood in the West) as well as a relaxation in some aspects of cultural expression. The pursuit or construction of ‘communism’ as a project was officially abandoned and replaced by the goal of “preserving the social gains of socialism” meaning the preservation as much as possible of the welfare state, while making some concessions to private capital in terms of allowing foreign investment and some local private enterprise to operate.
Externally, the Period ushered in a new era of Cuban Foreign relations as the country was forced to seek new markets for its products, develop new export and foreign currency earning industries and attract foreign investment. At the same time, the government found itself having to combat intensified attempts by the United States to isolate the island and extend its embargo.
The Special Period had a number of negative social effects not least the rise in the informal market and an increase in the division between those who had income in hard currency and those who did not. There has been an increase in prostitution and of petty corruption, though how far these phenomena are threatening to the system is debateable as it is possible to argue that these pernicious trends have been exaggerated by the Western media.
What is more certain is to observe that the response of the Cuban population to the crisis can be encapsulated in the phrase ‘flight and fight’. Over the last decade and a half out migration became a survival strategy for many as significant numbers of Cubans have left the island to seek employment. In 1994 there was the famous ‘rafters crisis’ in which some 100,000 Cubans left in makeshift boats. This crisis produced a migration agreement in 1995 with the US in which the US has undertaken to accept 20,000 legal migrants per year. In addition, an illegal traffic in migrants estimated of between 10,000 and 20,000 Cubans per year, adds significantly to the drain on the population. It could be that as many as 500,000 Cubans have left Cuba since 1995, and for the first time in 2006 and 2007 the population of the island has shown a negative growth trend.
On the other hand, it is clear that of the 11.2 million Cubans that have remained on the island, a significant majority have opted to ‘fight’ the privations of the Special Period. There has been a stoical resistance in order to preserve what are perceived to be the gains of the revolution. Radical engagement with the Cuban government has been remarkably evident within broad sections of the working and professional classes. The government has assiduously worked to engage with and incorporate the population, especially the youth. It has been the unity of the population that has remained and the support it has shown for the government that has been the major factor in the survival of the revolutionary process to date.
As the economy continues to grow and the passing of Fidel Castro from power has been taking place, it is becoming evident that the Cuban revolution is entering a new and unprecedented stage. Another reform process, not unlike that which occurred at the start of the ‘Special Period’ has been undertaken under the guidance of Raúl Castro that could have far reaching consequences. At the same time, new challenges are facing the country- in particular the ecological and world food crises that require urgent government attention. This paper will end with a brief summary of the changes being introduced and make some suggestions as to where they might be leading, although a certain prediction is not at this stage either possible or advisable to make.
by Dr Stephen Wilkinson, International Institute for the Study of Cuba, London Metropolitan University, 15 May 2008.
Introduction: What was the ‘Special Period’
The term ‘Special Period in Peacetime’ has a curious etymology that explains much about its nature. It is derived from the phrase ‘Special Period in time of war’ which was the name given to the survival plan that Cuba had prepared during the Cold War in case of a conflict breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States. In such a scenario, Cuba would have been bereft of its supplies and possibly completely blockaded, so there was a contingency plan that would ensure that there would be an orderly response to the scarcities of food and fuel that would ensue. When the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989-91, Cuba was left without its main trading partners and economic patron, to all intents a situation exactly similar to that which would have happened in a war - hence the adoption of the war contingency plan and it being called by the same name save for the circumstance of ‘peacetime.’
Thus the ‘Special Period’ was initially the putting into action of a planned response to the economic crisis that began in 1991 as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the COMECON countries of Eastern Europe. The ‘Special Period’ became institutionalised later to signify the extended period of deprivation that ensued and the long haul out of recession. By being called ‘special’ and a ‘period’ it always conveyed a sense of the ephemeral. Implicit in the name is the notion that the situation is temporary, the bad times would eventually pass.
The economic depression of the Special Period was at its most severe in the early-to-mid 1990s before slightly declining in severity towards the end of the decade. Since the beginning of the present century, and especially since 2003 onwards, Cuba has been experiencing an accelerated economic growth so that while officially the ‘Special Period’ has not been formally ended, it is now increasingly perceived as a thing of the past. Recent economic reforms instituted since Raúl Castro took over the Presidency in February 2008 are indicators that the restraints imposed on the Cuban population to combat the crisis are now no longer necessary. Thus it is increasingly possible to talk of the Special Period in the past tense.
The Special Period was defined primarily by severe shortages of hydrocarbon energy resources in the form of petrol, diesel, and other oil derivatives that occurred when the economic agreements between the oil-rich Soviet Union and Cuba suddenly ceased. Internally, the period was characterised by a reform process that transformed of the Cuban revolutionary programme, bringing changes in the economy, the introduction of sustainable agriculture techniques, a decreased use of energy, the overhaul of industry and a diversification of the economic base. The period also required political changes that introduced some elements of greater democracy and involvement by the Cuban population in decision-making (though not liberal democracy as understood in the West) as well as a relaxation in some aspects of cultural expression. The pursuit or construction of ‘communism’ as a project was officially abandoned and replaced by the goal of “preserving the social gains of socialism” meaning the preservation as much as possible of the welfare state, while making some concessions to private capital in terms of allowing foreign investment and some local private enterprise to operate.
Externally, the Period ushered in a new era of Cuban Foreign relations as the country was forced to seek new markets for its products, develop new export and foreign currency earning industries and attract foreign investment. At the same time, the government found itself having to combat intensified attempts by the United States to isolate the island and extend its embargo.
The Special Period had a number of negative social effects not least the rise in the informal market and an increase in the division between those who had income in hard currency and those who did not. There has been an increase in prostitution and of petty corruption, though how far these phenomena are threatening to the system is debateable as it is possible to argue that these pernicious trends have been exaggerated by the Western media.
What is more certain is to observe that the response of the Cuban population to the crisis can be encapsulated in the phrase ‘flight and fight’. Over the last decade and a half out migration became a survival strategy for many as significant numbers of Cubans have left the island to seek employment. In 1994 there was the famous ‘rafters crisis’ in which some 100,000 Cubans left in makeshift boats. This crisis produced a migration agreement in 1995 with the US in which the US has undertaken to accept 20,000 legal migrants per year. In addition, an illegal traffic in migrants estimated of between 10,000 and 20,000 Cubans per year, adds significantly to the drain on the population. It could be that as many as 500,000 Cubans have left Cuba since 1995, and for the first time in 2006 and 2007 the population of the island has shown a negative growth trend.
On the other hand, it is clear that of the 11.2 million Cubans that have remained on the island, a significant majority have opted to ‘fight’ the privations of the Special Period. There has been a stoical resistance in order to preserve what are perceived to be the gains of the revolution. Radical engagement with the Cuban government has been remarkably evident within broad sections of the working and professional classes. The government has assiduously worked to engage with and incorporate the population, especially the youth. It has been the unity of the population that has remained and the support it has shown for the government that has been the major factor in the survival of the revolutionary process to date.
As the economy continues to grow and the passing of Fidel Castro from power has been taking place, it is becoming evident that the Cuban revolution is entering a new and unprecedented stage. Another reform process, not unlike that which occurred at the start of the ‘Special Period’ has been undertaken under the guidance of Raúl Castro that could have far reaching consequences. At the same time, new challenges are facing the country- in particular the ecological and world food crises that require urgent government attention. This paper will end with a brief summary of the changes being introduced and make some suggestions as to where they might be leading, although a certain prediction is not at this stage either possible or advisable to make.
Sunday, 20 February 2011
Venezuela: revolution mobilises after disastrous floods
by Sam McGill.
Source: Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism! (FRFI), no. 219, February/March 2011.
Despite disastrous flooding across the region, the socialist government in Venezuela has continued to push forward the Bolivarian Revolution through land and other expropriations, and by developing popular participation in tackling the housing crisis. Floods and landslides affected over 40% of the country, leaving 138,000 Venezuelans homeless and killing 35 people. In response, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved an enabling law on 15 December 2010 allowing President Hugo Chavez to enact decrees related to flood recovery independently of the National Assembly. These powers are limited to a maximum period of 18 months; Chavez has said that he will return these powers to Congress in May.
Enabling laws have been used many times by previous presidents in Venezuela. They can be modified or rescinded by the National Assembly, or revoked by citizens if 5% of voters request a referendum. Despite this, Venezuela’s opposition and the international media have rushed to condemn Chavez as a ‘dictator’ and the emergency measures for flood relief as a ‘totalitarian ambush’ and ‘brutal attack ...against democratic life’ (the opposition Tal Cual newspaper). Such lies were freely repeated by The Independent, The Economist, and the BBC. Opposition leaders from the Democratic Table of Unity met with the General Secretary of the Washington-based Organisation of American States, Jose Insulza, on 12 January, demanding that it intervene in Venezuela to ‘re-establish normality’. With the increased Republican representation in the US Congress, there have been fresh calls for sanctions against Venezuelan oil.
These threats have not deterred the revolution even though the floods have worsened the housing shortage, now estimated to be between 2-3 million new homes. The government calculates that a minimum of 135,000 to 200,000 new homes are needed per year to address the crisis. With the new executive powers, Chavez has set up a 10bn Bolivar (US$2.3bn) emergency fund, including $500m recovered from frozen US accounts, deposited in 1999 following an IMF demand under a Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund. Venezuela repaid its debts to the World Bank and cut off all ties with the IMF in 2007.
Although the enabling law has allowed the government to respond rapidly to the floods, urban land activists and tenants associations have also organised communities locally. 165.4m Bolivars (US$ 38.5m) has been granted from the Popular Power Fund for the development of five housing projects across Caracas to be run by ‘Pioneers of New Socialist Communities’, committees of homeless families who have set up camps on unoccupied land.
Future decrees are expected to extend agricultural credits to rebuild food production and to reconstruct flood-affected rural zones, and housing laws that Chavez states will ‘guarantee the right to adequate, safe, comfortable, and hygienic housing’. Two private companies, Sanitarios Maracay, a toilet manufacturer, and Venezuelan Aluminium, have been nationalised to control the production necessary for reconstruction. Several private golf courses may be expropriated for housing. Venezuela has also received international solidarity including 6,900 tons of cement from Cuba, which has further promised to send 500,000 square metres of concrete roof tiles, 200,000 metres of ceramic tiles and other material for flood refugee centres.
New Year, new National Assembly, new challenges
The new National Assembly was sworn in on 5 January 2011. The opposition coalition of the Democratic Table of Unity now has 65 seats compared to 96 taken by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. To consolidate the Bolivarian Revolution, the outgoing National Assembly approved laws which will rein in private finance, prevent the formation of financial groups and prohibit banks from having an interest in brokerage firms and insurance companies. It also approved a group of five ‘popular power’ laws promoting decentralisation of power, collective property and self-government.
Crucially, the outgoing National Assembly passed the Defence of Political Sovereignty and National Self Determination Law making foreign funding of political organisations illegal (as in the US) and allowing the expulsion of any foreign citizens involved. This is key to limiting imperialist interference in Venezuela. In 2010 the FRIDE Institute published US State Department documents declassified under the Freedom of Information Act. Agencies including the United States Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as the European Commission, were found to be pumping an annual $40-50m to Venezuela’s opposition parties and media to bring down the Bolivarian Revolution.
They will not succeed!
Source: Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism! (FRFI), no. 219, February/March 2011.
Despite disastrous flooding across the region, the socialist government in Venezuela has continued to push forward the Bolivarian Revolution through land and other expropriations, and by developing popular participation in tackling the housing crisis. Floods and landslides affected over 40% of the country, leaving 138,000 Venezuelans homeless and killing 35 people. In response, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved an enabling law on 15 December 2010 allowing President Hugo Chavez to enact decrees related to flood recovery independently of the National Assembly. These powers are limited to a maximum period of 18 months; Chavez has said that he will return these powers to Congress in May.
Enabling laws have been used many times by previous presidents in Venezuela. They can be modified or rescinded by the National Assembly, or revoked by citizens if 5% of voters request a referendum. Despite this, Venezuela’s opposition and the international media have rushed to condemn Chavez as a ‘dictator’ and the emergency measures for flood relief as a ‘totalitarian ambush’ and ‘brutal attack ...against democratic life’ (the opposition Tal Cual newspaper). Such lies were freely repeated by The Independent, The Economist, and the BBC. Opposition leaders from the Democratic Table of Unity met with the General Secretary of the Washington-based Organisation of American States, Jose Insulza, on 12 January, demanding that it intervene in Venezuela to ‘re-establish normality’. With the increased Republican representation in the US Congress, there have been fresh calls for sanctions against Venezuelan oil.
These threats have not deterred the revolution even though the floods have worsened the housing shortage, now estimated to be between 2-3 million new homes. The government calculates that a minimum of 135,000 to 200,000 new homes are needed per year to address the crisis. With the new executive powers, Chavez has set up a 10bn Bolivar (US$2.3bn) emergency fund, including $500m recovered from frozen US accounts, deposited in 1999 following an IMF demand under a Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund. Venezuela repaid its debts to the World Bank and cut off all ties with the IMF in 2007.
Although the enabling law has allowed the government to respond rapidly to the floods, urban land activists and tenants associations have also organised communities locally. 165.4m Bolivars (US$ 38.5m) has been granted from the Popular Power Fund for the development of five housing projects across Caracas to be run by ‘Pioneers of New Socialist Communities’, committees of homeless families who have set up camps on unoccupied land.
Future decrees are expected to extend agricultural credits to rebuild food production and to reconstruct flood-affected rural zones, and housing laws that Chavez states will ‘guarantee the right to adequate, safe, comfortable, and hygienic housing’. Two private companies, Sanitarios Maracay, a toilet manufacturer, and Venezuelan Aluminium, have been nationalised to control the production necessary for reconstruction. Several private golf courses may be expropriated for housing. Venezuela has also received international solidarity including 6,900 tons of cement from Cuba, which has further promised to send 500,000 square metres of concrete roof tiles, 200,000 metres of ceramic tiles and other material for flood refugee centres.
New Year, new National Assembly, new challenges
The new National Assembly was sworn in on 5 January 2011. The opposition coalition of the Democratic Table of Unity now has 65 seats compared to 96 taken by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. To consolidate the Bolivarian Revolution, the outgoing National Assembly approved laws which will rein in private finance, prevent the formation of financial groups and prohibit banks from having an interest in brokerage firms and insurance companies. It also approved a group of five ‘popular power’ laws promoting decentralisation of power, collective property and self-government.
Crucially, the outgoing National Assembly passed the Defence of Political Sovereignty and National Self Determination Law making foreign funding of political organisations illegal (as in the US) and allowing the expulsion of any foreign citizens involved. This is key to limiting imperialist interference in Venezuela. In 2010 the FRIDE Institute published US State Department documents declassified under the Freedom of Information Act. Agencies including the United States Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as the European Commission, were found to be pumping an annual $40-50m to Venezuela’s opposition parties and media to bring down the Bolivarian Revolution.
They will not succeed!
Wednesday, 17 November 2010
Background to land struggles in Honduras
Violence and Death in the Aguan Valley
by Gilberto Ríos, FIAN (Food First and Information and Action Network), 15 November 2010.
Source: HondurasResists
In response to the persistent violence in the Aguán Valley and the manipulative intent on the part of many communication media, we must remember important events that clarify the conflict over land tenure in what was known as the Regional Center for Military Training (CREM).
In 1977, Temístocles Ramírez, a United States citizen of Puerto Rican origin, purchased 5,700 hectares along the coast, paying 165 thousand Lempiras in a flagrant violation of the Constitution which prohibits foreigners from owning land on coastlines and borders.
Within the framework of the national security doctrine, in 1983, the United States required the government of Honduras to install the CREM and this required the expropriation of property from Temístocles Ramírez. In 1987, Temístocles appealed the government of the United States, demanding indemnification for “his” land. On June 29th of that year, the U.S. House of Representatives agreed to reduce a $51 million loan to Honduras by $17 million with which the government of Honduras paid Temístocles this multi million dollar sum. These lands were paid with external debt and titled to the State of Honduras.
In 1991, during the government of Callejas, a new Municipalities Law was passed, allowing municipalities to sell all untitled lands, national and collective. The municipality of Trujillo sold the CREM lands to local cattle ranchers for only 23-30 Lempiras per hectare. In other words, what the government had purchased for 17 million dollars, the municipality sold for less than 50 thousand. The sale was illegal because the CREM lands were not collective, nor national, but land titled to the State.
In 1993, the Attorney General formally transferred these lands to INA to be distributed to landless peasants. However, the violent conflict did not end there. Even though the land purchases were illegal, the landowners demanded the State of Honduras to pay improvements and the government ceded, paying 105 million Lempiras.
From August 2008 to September 2009, there have been between 17 and 19 deaths as a result of the conflict between the peasants of the Guadalupe Carney Community (GC) and the landowners. Unfortunately, the conflict does not end there. Several years ago, Miguel Facussé planted 700 acres of African Palm on lands belonging to this community. According to the peasants of Guadalupe Carney, Miguel Facussé took these lands illegally together with other large landholders in the area: Rene Morales and the national member of Congress, Oscar Nájera.
The peasants know that these lands belong to them, and so nine months ago they occupied them, but Miguel Facussé reacted by using approximately 300 private security guards to evict them. As a result, negotiations were initiated between the MCA peasants and Miguel Facussé, who approached the negotiations from the perspective that the land did not belong to the peasants. The discussion, therefore, focused on the payment of improvements, in an attempt by Facussé to take advantage of the resources of the Honduran State. The negotiations moved very slowly and the INA (National Agrarian Institute) did not participate to the extent that it is required to by law, allowing the violence to emerge.
Under these circumstances, at 04:00 today, peasants from Guadelupe Carney occupied the 700 manzanas of land that Miguel Facussé illegally occupies in the “El Tumbador” sector. Following the occupation, approximately 300 of Miguel Facussé's private guards attempted to evict them. According to the same source, an exchange of gunshots lasted four hours.
At the time of this statement (approximately 17:30 CST), the following deaths are confirmed: Teodoro Acosta, campesino from the “Nueva Vida” community; Ignacio Reyes from “Familia Unida Dos”; Raúl Castillo from “14 de mayo” and Ciriaco Muñoz from “Nueva Esperanza”. There are four wounded; Calidonio Ramírez, Pedro Eleazar Deras, Marvin Jerónimo Méndez Leiva and Abraham Martínez, and two disappeared; José Luis Sauceda and Noé Pérez. The homes and cooperative buildings in the communities of “10 de abril” and “14 de julio” were damaged by shots fired by Miguel Facussé's security guards.
Suspiciously, the police did not arrive at the scene until 12:30 and seemed to have been expecting more dramatic results. Their intention and the result of their actions was the eviction of the peasants and leaving the lands in question in the possession of Facussé's guards.
It has again been made clear that the state institutions are at the service of the large landholders of the region and private security guards are acting for the repressive state organs and proceeding to capture, torture, and assassinate those who oppose the powerful, with full authority and complicity of the police.
We urge human rights organizations, governments, and transnational organizations to pressure Porfirio Lobo's regime to halt the violence that has caused so much damage to the residents of the Aguán Valley.
Macuelizo, November 15th, 2010
Gilberto Ríos
Secretario Ejecutivo
FIAN Internacional
Sección Honduras
by Gilberto Ríos, FIAN (Food First and Information and Action Network), 15 November 2010.
Source: HondurasResists
In response to the persistent violence in the Aguán Valley and the manipulative intent on the part of many communication media, we must remember important events that clarify the conflict over land tenure in what was known as the Regional Center for Military Training (CREM).
In 1977, Temístocles Ramírez, a United States citizen of Puerto Rican origin, purchased 5,700 hectares along the coast, paying 165 thousand Lempiras in a flagrant violation of the Constitution which prohibits foreigners from owning land on coastlines and borders.
Within the framework of the national security doctrine, in 1983, the United States required the government of Honduras to install the CREM and this required the expropriation of property from Temístocles Ramírez. In 1987, Temístocles appealed the government of the United States, demanding indemnification for “his” land. On June 29th of that year, the U.S. House of Representatives agreed to reduce a $51 million loan to Honduras by $17 million with which the government of Honduras paid Temístocles this multi million dollar sum. These lands were paid with external debt and titled to the State of Honduras.
In 1991, during the government of Callejas, a new Municipalities Law was passed, allowing municipalities to sell all untitled lands, national and collective. The municipality of Trujillo sold the CREM lands to local cattle ranchers for only 23-30 Lempiras per hectare. In other words, what the government had purchased for 17 million dollars, the municipality sold for less than 50 thousand. The sale was illegal because the CREM lands were not collective, nor national, but land titled to the State.
In 1993, the Attorney General formally transferred these lands to INA to be distributed to landless peasants. However, the violent conflict did not end there. Even though the land purchases were illegal, the landowners demanded the State of Honduras to pay improvements and the government ceded, paying 105 million Lempiras.
From August 2008 to September 2009, there have been between 17 and 19 deaths as a result of the conflict between the peasants of the Guadalupe Carney Community (GC) and the landowners. Unfortunately, the conflict does not end there. Several years ago, Miguel Facussé planted 700 acres of African Palm on lands belonging to this community. According to the peasants of Guadalupe Carney, Miguel Facussé took these lands illegally together with other large landholders in the area: Rene Morales and the national member of Congress, Oscar Nájera.
The peasants know that these lands belong to them, and so nine months ago they occupied them, but Miguel Facussé reacted by using approximately 300 private security guards to evict them. As a result, negotiations were initiated between the MCA peasants and Miguel Facussé, who approached the negotiations from the perspective that the land did not belong to the peasants. The discussion, therefore, focused on the payment of improvements, in an attempt by Facussé to take advantage of the resources of the Honduran State. The negotiations moved very slowly and the INA (National Agrarian Institute) did not participate to the extent that it is required to by law, allowing the violence to emerge.
Under these circumstances, at 04:00 today, peasants from Guadelupe Carney occupied the 700 manzanas of land that Miguel Facussé illegally occupies in the “El Tumbador” sector. Following the occupation, approximately 300 of Miguel Facussé's private guards attempted to evict them. According to the same source, an exchange of gunshots lasted four hours.
At the time of this statement (approximately 17:30 CST), the following deaths are confirmed: Teodoro Acosta, campesino from the “Nueva Vida” community; Ignacio Reyes from “Familia Unida Dos”; Raúl Castillo from “14 de mayo” and Ciriaco Muñoz from “Nueva Esperanza”. There are four wounded; Calidonio Ramírez, Pedro Eleazar Deras, Marvin Jerónimo Méndez Leiva and Abraham Martínez, and two disappeared; José Luis Sauceda and Noé Pérez. The homes and cooperative buildings in the communities of “10 de abril” and “14 de julio” were damaged by shots fired by Miguel Facussé's security guards.
Suspiciously, the police did not arrive at the scene until 12:30 and seemed to have been expecting more dramatic results. Their intention and the result of their actions was the eviction of the peasants and leaving the lands in question in the possession of Facussé's guards.
It has again been made clear that the state institutions are at the service of the large landholders of the region and private security guards are acting for the repressive state organs and proceeding to capture, torture, and assassinate those who oppose the powerful, with full authority and complicity of the police.
We urge human rights organizations, governments, and transnational organizations to pressure Porfirio Lobo's regime to halt the violence that has caused so much damage to the residents of the Aguán Valley.
Macuelizo, November 15th, 2010
Gilberto Ríos
Secretario Ejecutivo
FIAN Internacional
Sección Honduras
Wednesday, 28 April 2010
RATB reports: The struggle of the urban land committees in Venezuela
Land and housing for the people!
by Sam McGill in Venezuela.
“Lets go to them, go to these sites (empty buildings and disused land), because we have to build houses there!” - Hugo Chavez Frias, Sunday 11 April 2010 (from Alo Presidente).
Currently in the city of Merida (Merida State, North West Venezuela) there are approximately forty-eight interconnected land occupations taking place. Based on Articles 22 and 33 of the Urban Land Act, urban land committees identify disused land and empty buildings in the area and organise to guard it for ninety days, after which it is recognised as their land. Working alongside the Ezequiel Zamora Coordination and various unions such as the Union of Social Workers, they put pressure on local mayors and governors, with funding from PDVSA to build popular housing for the people.
Though a national call, the most developed committees and networks have been vigilant in Merida, particularly in response to business group plans to convert land into shopping malls and casinos without consulting Community Councils or other organs of popular power. The law around urban land was strengthened in August 2009 when the National Assembly unanimously passed emergency regulations giving land committees and communities more power to take over the land. The people responded with organised committees and land custodies and now Chavez is pressuring Mayors and Governors to follow through with the law, facilitating, funding and commencing the clearing of land and construction of popular housing.
The Land committee of Las Americas, have been occupying a large block of overgrown and disused land opposite the Venezuelan Social Security Institute for forty days, nearly half of the ninety-day target. It’s 200 members organise shifts to guard the land, one in the morning, one in the afternoon and one overnight. As Maribel Guillen, on shift to guard the land emphasises “This land is not being used productively, there are people who need houses in our community, we will continue to guard the land and put pressure on whoever necessary to get houses built here”.
This struggle is particularly important in the run up to the September National Assembly elections. Opposition Mayors and Governors are maneuvering to stall the process, blocking funding, adding bureaucratic obstacles or 'losing' paperwork. However the continued fight within the community and revolutionary sections of the state will determine the success of the struggle for housing, development of community power and ultimately the progress and popularity of the Revolution.
Expropriation! Confiscation! Nationalisation!
Land and housing for people not profit!
by Sam McGill in Venezuela.
“Lets go to them, go to these sites (empty buildings and disused land), because we have to build houses there!” - Hugo Chavez Frias, Sunday 11 April 2010 (from Alo Presidente).
Though a national call, the most developed committees and networks have been vigilant in Merida, particularly in response to business group plans to convert land into shopping malls and casinos without consulting Community Councils or other organs of popular power. The law around urban land was strengthened in August 2009 when the National Assembly unanimously passed emergency regulations giving land committees and communities more power to take over the land. The people responded with organised committees and land custodies and now Chavez is pressuring Mayors and Governors to follow through with the law, facilitating, funding and commencing the clearing of land and construction of popular housing.
The Land committee of Las Americas, have been occupying a large block of overgrown and disused land opposite the Venezuelan Social Security Institute for forty days, nearly half of the ninety-day target. It’s 200 members organise shifts to guard the land, one in the morning, one in the afternoon and one overnight. As Maribel Guillen, on shift to guard the land emphasises “This land is not being used productively, there are people who need houses in our community, we will continue to guard the land and put pressure on whoever necessary to get houses built here”.
This struggle is particularly important in the run up to the September National Assembly elections. Opposition Mayors and Governors are maneuvering to stall the process, blocking funding, adding bureaucratic obstacles or 'losing' paperwork. However the continued fight within the community and revolutionary sections of the state will determine the success of the struggle for housing, development of community power and ultimately the progress and popularity of the Revolution.
Expropriation! Confiscation! Nationalisation!
Land and housing for people not profit!
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